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The second document is a set of contrasting essays by top educational experts addressing the
educational policy issues at stake in this debate. The first, written by Paul Peterson, Harvard
Professor of Government and Director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance,
urges the adoption of citywide pilot voucher programs. Peterson says that such programs, if prop-
erly designed, hold out the possibility of decreasing the education gap between black and white
Americans. The second, written by Stanford Professor of Education and Economics Martin Carnoy,
argues that close examination of several existing voucher programs in the United States and
abroad reveals that the academic gains for struggling students and schools are marginal at best,
and often simply non-existent.
The Forum provides these materials as part of our mission to serve as both a town hall and a
clearinghouse of information. The Forum takes no position on these or other constitutional or
policy issues but brings together diverse points of view for discussion of issues at the intersection
of religion and public affairs. The Forum’s co-chairs are Jean Bethke Elshtain and E.J. Dionne, Jr.,
and it is supported by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts to Georgetown University.
We hope that these materials will be useful to you as you face important decisions regarding law
and policy.
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Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes
The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 27, 2002 decision in the Cleveland school voucher case ended
some longstanding debates and opened new chapters in others. Because the Court has settled a
key federal constitutional issue in the school voucher debate, we thought it would be helpful to
provide an expert and nonpartisan assessment of where the law currently stands. We also
believed that a presentation of contrasting arguments on educational policy would help to clarify
the issues in dispute. What follows are two documents commissioned by the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life that serve these purposes.
The first document is a joint statement by leading law professors explaining the constitutional
principles announced by the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and providing an overview of
the next rounds of constitutional debate in the wake of the Court’s decision. Drafters of the state-
ment include those who argued strongly that the Cleveland voucher plan was constitutional, those
who argued strongly that the plan was unconstitutional and those who fell somewhere in
between. In this document, these scholars come together to provide nonpartisan description and
analysis of the Court’s resolution of this issue. They discuss the elements of the Cleveland
voucher plan that led the Court to uphold it and consider some potential applications of the
Court’s opinion. The professors also provide a brief and balanced description of major arguments
on two important constitutional issues the Court did not resolve – the applicability and validity of
state constitutional provisions governing aid to religious schools and questions surrounding regu-
latory conditions that may accompany voucher funds.
Because the group is comprised of those who differ on whether the Court correctly decided
Zelman and on the proper outcome of the debates ahead, the document takes no side on these
issues. Furthermore, the statement expresses no views on whether educational vouchers are good
policy. Drafters of this joint statement are Thomas Berg of the University of St. Thomas Law
School (Minnesota), Alan E. Brownstein of the University of California Davis School of Law, Erwin
Chemerinsky of the University of Southern California Law School, John Garvey of Boston College
Law School, Douglas Laycock of the University of Texas Law School, Ira C. Lupu of the George
Washington University Law School, William Marshall of the University of North Carolina School of
Law and Robert Tuttle of the George Washington University Law School. Thomas Berg served as
the principal draftsperson of the statement.
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vouchers – not to assert what those principles ought to be. We disagree among ourselves on
whether Zelman was a proper interpretation of the Establishment Clause, and on how the consti-
tutional issues that remain should be resolved. On those remaining questions, we can only pro-
vide a brief overview of the competing arguments that are likely to be made in future litigation
and public debate.
I. Zelman and Vouchers Under the Establishment
Clause
A. The Cleveland Program
The Cleveland voucher program was a response to the failure of Cleveland’s public schools,
which have ranked among the worst performing in the nation – in 1996 only one in 10 ninth
graders passed a basic proficiency examination, and in 1995 a federal judge placed the district
under state control.2 The Ohio legislature in 1999 enacted a package of assistance to Cleveland
students. A student could remain in the public schools and receive state-reimbursed tutorial ses-
sions, or attend a private school or certain other public schools and receive a tuition grant –
essentially a voucher – of up to $2,250. Parents could choose any private school in Cleveland, or
any public school district adjacent to Cleveland, that decided to participate in the program. An
adjacent public school that participated would receive the $2,250 payment from the state in addi-
tion to the state’s ordinary share of per-pupil funding for each voucher student; if a parent chose
a private school, the state would send a check, payable to the parents, to the school and the par-
ents would endorse it over to the school.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that Ohio’s was “a program of true private choice,” one
“in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independ-
ent choices of private individuals.”3 Such a program, the Court said, does not violate the
Establishment Clause prohibition on government “advancing religion” because the decision to use
the funds at a religious school “is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”4 If a voucher program leaves
parents with a genuine choice of schools where they can use the benefit, it is constitutional.
The key to Zelman, then, is to understand what features make a program one of “true
private choice.” The Court emphasized three criteria:
• The program was neutral toward religion;
• Any monies flowing to religious schools flowed through the decisions of individuals rather than
as direct payments from the state; and
• The program offered parents genuine secular options for their children’s schooling.
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In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,1 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
program that allows parents to use state-funded vouchers to send their children to religiously
affiliated elementary and secondary schools. The decision is significant because for many years
there were questions about whether the inclusion of religious schools in such a program would
survive a constitutional challenge under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. After Zelman, it appears that the Establishment Clause will permit voucher
plans to include religious schools in many circumstances. 
But in opening the Establishment Clause door for vouchers, Zelman also invites a new set of con-
stitutional questions. This statement explains the Zelman decision and briefly summarizes the
likely upcoming rounds of constitutional questions. We are constitutional law scholars, and we
express no views here on whether voucher programs are good policy. Moreover, our purpose
here is to describe and analyze the constitutional principles that the courts apply concerning
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3. Genuine Secular Options. Finally, Zelman emphasized that the program “provide[s] genuine
opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options” – that it “permits [them]
to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious.”11 Parents
could choose to send their children to nonreligious private schools; they could choose community
schools and magnet public schools; they could choose any adjacent suburban public school dis-
trict that agreed to accept voucher students (although none of those districts had actually agreed
to do so by 2002); and finally, they could elect to keep their children in a regular Cleveland
public school while availing themselves of publicly funded tutorial aid.
The Zelman analysis suggests several points about how to determine whether choice and options
are genuine. First, the actual percentage of aid that ends up at religious institutions usually will be
irrelevant to whether other options are deemed genuine. The challengers in Zelman objected that
46 of 56 participating private schools (82 percent) were religious, and that in the litigation year 96
percent of the voucher aid was used at religious schools. But the Court responded that because
81 percent of private schools in Ohio are religious – virtually the same percentage as in the pro-
gram – the “preponderance of religious affiliated private schools…did not arise as a result of the
program” but was independent of it.12 It added that basing a standard of constitutionality on the
actual percentages of aid used could not provide “certainty” or “principled standards,” because
the statistics would vary from year to year and location to location.13
In this respect, the requirement of genuine secular options appears to reinforce the neutrality
requirement. As long as the decision of private schools to participate in the voucher program and
the decision of the parents to enroll their children in religious schools cannot be attributed to any
government action, the actual choices made by parents and the involvement, or lack of involve-
ment, of particular schools has no bearing on the constitutionality of the program. A different
analysis would apply if the preponderance of religious schools participating in the program or the
percentage of children enrolled in religious schools could be traced to government action pro-
moting religious school involvement or skewing parental decisions toward the enrollment of their
children in religious schools.
Second, the universe of relevant options includes schools outside the voucher program itself –
including, potentially, the regular public schools. The question whether the state “is coercing par-
ents into sending their children to religious schools,” the Court said, “must be answered by evalu-
ating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren.”14 Thus the universe of relevant options
included the community and magnet schools and even the tutoring offered in regular Cleveland
public schools – since all of these options were available to parents. When the community and
magnet schools were counted as options, the percentage of children who chose religious schools
was less than 20 percent.15
Third, there may be future arguments over the quality of secular educational options as part
of determining whether they are “genuine” – although the Court is not likely to be highly
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1. Neutrality. The Court first emphasized that the Ohio program was “neutral in all respects toward
religion.”5 Both the class of beneficiaries – children in Cleveland public schools – and the class of
eligible institutions were “defined without reference to religion.” Both secular and religious pri-
vate schools within Cleveland were eligible, as were adjacent public school districts. There were
no more favorable terms for religious schools than for other schools – indeed, several terms gave
more favorable treatment to public schools than to private schools. Adjacent public schools partic-
ipating would receive from the state not only the voucher amount, but also the state’s ordinary
per-pupil contribution; and parents could choose community schools (Cleveland’s term for charter
schools) or magnet schools in the Cleveland public system and still receive free tuition, while at
private schools all parents would have to make at least some co-payment.6 (We will say more
about the relevance of community and magnet schools shortly.)
Neutrality in this sense – the same terms for religious recipients as for secular recipients – should
be fairly easy for a voucher program to satisfy. The program should simply avoid terms that for-
mally give aid in greater amounts, or under more favorable criteria, to religious entities. Neutrality
is related to parental choice, in the Court’s view, because “where the aid is made available on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria,” then it generally does not “ ‘create [any] financial incentives for
parents to choose a sectarian school.’ ”
As noted above, the Ohio program actually provided less money to private schools, including reli-
gious schools, than the state gave to various public alternatives – $2,250 per student to private
schools compared with anywhere from $4,167 to more than $6,000 in state funding per student
for the public options. The Zelman majority pointed to this to bolster the conclusion that the pro-
gram did not skew incentives toward religion, but it added that “such features of the program are
not necessary to its constitutionality.”7 It appears that while the state may provide less money per
student to religious schools than to others, it may also provide an equal amount – at least up to
the per-pupil cost in religious schools.
2. Decisions by Individuals. Although the point is not at issue in Zelman, it is important to empha-
size that the majority’s approval extends only to programs in which aid reaches schools because
of the “independent choices of private individuals” – as opposed to “programs that provide aid
directly [from the government] to religious schools.”8 In referring to this distinction, Zelman cited
an earlier Supreme Court decision approving the provision of materials and equipment to reli-
gious schools but holding that direct aid must be restricted to secular uses even if made broadly
available on the same terms to religious and non-religious alike.9 Vouchers for private-school
tuition typically contain no such restriction on use, and therefore to be valid under the federal
Constitution they must channel aid through some mechanism of individual choice – for example,
the Cleveland arrangement under which parents choosing a private school endorsed their state
check over to the school. Nor will it suffice under current law for the state to allocate direct aid
to private schools based on a per-student formula.10
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tained neutrality, the court must consider “all [genuine] options [the state] provides [to] school-
children,” including those outside the specific program such as the charter, magnet and even reg-
ular public schools (if they are adequate).
II. The Next Rounds: Constitutional Issues After Zelman
As mentioned above, by largely resolving the basic Establishment Clause challenge, Zelman
opens the door for new sets of constitutional issues concerning vouchers. The following questions
will likely become central in the next few years. But Zelman says little or nothing directly about
these questions, and even lower courts have made only a few rulings on them in voucher cases.
The questions therefore remain largely open – and the signers of this statement have significant
disagreements on how they should be resolved. For these reasons, this statement can only touch
briefly on these issues and on the main arguments that the contending sides are likely to present.
A. State Constitutional Restrictions on Vouchers
Resolving a key Establishment Clause issue eliminates only one source of constitutional challenges
to the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs. More than two-thirds of the states have
constitutional provisions that restrict aid to religious organizations more explicitly than does the
Establishment Clause. These provisions, mostly dating from the late 1800s and early 1900s, will
play a significant role in the voucher debates in state legislatures, and will form the basis for legal
challenges to voucher plans that are enacted. The state restrictions vary in their language, how-
ever, and can be interpreted in varying ways. Moreover, they will in turn be challenged under the
federal Constitution.
1. Interpretation of State Provisions. Although the state restrictions might be analyzed in a number
of ways, it is helpful to group them into three categories. Each state provision, of course, will
generate its own distinct set of textual, historical and precedent-based arguments.20
A few provisions say that government funds may not be used for any private school – or in the
language of some provisions, that all schools supported by public funds must be under the
“exclusive control” of public authorities. Such language, if applied to vouchers, would exclude
secular as well as religious private schools.
A second large category of provisions prohibits the expenditure of public funds “in aid of,” or to
“support or benefit,” any “sectarian” school or school controlled by a “religious denomination.” In
all the textual variations, these provisions restrict aid to religious, but not to secular, private
schools. The phrases in these provisions tend to be strong in forbidding aid, but different state
courts have interpreted such provisions differently, some permitting voucher-style programs and
some forbidding them.21
demanding in evaluating the quality of secular educational options. The majority appeared to
place the burden of proof on those challenging the genuineness of the options – finding “no evi-
dence that the program fails to provide [secular] opportunities.”16 Justice O’Connor, writing on
this at more length, stated that nonreligious alternatives “need not be superior to religious schools
in every respect” but “need only be adequate substitutes for religious schools in the eyes of par-
ents,” and she criticized the dissent for adopting too narrow a view of what features would make
a school a reasonable alternative.17
How do these principles apply to voucher plans in particular contexts? Consider first the context
of the Cleveland plan itself: vouchers as a response to failing public school systems. In such
cases, the government should usually be able to offer a range of options. Since many failing sys-
tems are in large cities, there will often be charter or magnet schools, which Zelman declares to
be relevant choices, assuming they are “adequate.” Indeed, the Zelman majority indicates that the
regular public schools with additional tutorial assistance count as an option. It would be more
questionable whether the state could offer private-school vouchers as the only alternative to a
failing public system, without any reforms or supplements to the public system like Cleveland’s
community and magnet schools and tutorial assistance. If the state relied on such unreformed
public schools as a genuine option, challengers could reply that the very premise of the legisla-
tion was that the public schools were inadequate.
Next, consider vouchers outside the context of a failing public system: Imagine, most dramati-
cally, that a state offers all parents a choice between free public schools and a voucher for private
schools. This broader program also finds support in the logic of Zelman. Many areas of the state
will not offer community or magnet schools, but in many or most areas the regular public schools
will be adequate – unlike the case of the failing public system – and therefore may count as a
genuine option. And if the regular public schools count, their enrollment will almost always dwarf
that of private schools, thus ensuring sufficient secular options.
However, the broader hypothetical program does bring up an ambiguity in Zelman. The Court
stopped short of overruling one of its decisions from the early 1970s that had struck down a
tuition grant program similar in many respects to the Cleveland vouchers.18 Instead the majority
distinguished the earlier program on the ground that, unlike Ohio’s, it was not neutral with
respect to religion because it did not itself include any public schools and its purpose was to
“ ‘offe[r]…an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools.’ ” 19 These distinctions
might be used to challenge a statewide voucher program that simply covered private schools as
an alternative to traditional public schools; such a program, viewed in isolation, might be seen as
primarily aiding religious schools, rather than low-income parents as the Ohio program did. On
the other hand, these factual distinctions as to which programs are “neutral” might not survive if
they become the subject of future litigation. Voucher proponents could argue that the distinctions
are at odds with the general thrust of Zelman – that in determining whether the state has main-
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affected by anti-Catholicism also rest on legitimate rationales for separating church and state that
have the support of many people who are not anti-Catholic or anti-religious.
In general, the issues concerning state restrictions will involve a tension and require a resolution
between different principles that all have some importance for the current Supreme Court. On one
hand is the commitment to treating religious persons, activities and organizations no worse than
others that are similarly situated in terms of their access to government funds. On the other hand is
a commitment to allowing the government some discretion in how it spends its resources to pro-
vide educational opportunities for children, and a commitment to states’ rights – in this case, dis-
cretion for a state to separate church and state more strictly than the federal Constitution requires.
B. Regulations Accompanying Vouchers
If the inclusion of religious schools in a voucher plan survives both federal and state constitutional
challenges, the next round of litigation is likely to center on the regulations that accompany the
receipt of voucher funds. The Cleveland plan in Zelman forbade participating schools to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion, or to teach unlawful behavior or “hatred of any
person or group” based on race, ethnicity or religion.28 Justice Souter’s dissent argued that these
conditions on religious schools’ autonomy were a reason to invalidate the program,29 but the
majority ignored the point, suggesting the possibility that taxpayers challenging voucher programs
(as distinguished from direct funding programs) will not have standing to assert that such regula-
tions create the danger of “excessive entanglement” between the state and religious schools.
Rather, the two emerging categories of constitutional questions concerning regulation appear to be:
• If the state imposes conditions on vouchers that would affect the autonomy of a participating
religious school, may the school (or a parent wishing to use a voucher at the school) challenge
the condition as constitutionally forbidden?
• If the state exempts only religious schools from conditions on vouchers, is the exemption
constitutionally forbidden?
1. Constitutional Objections to Conditions. On the first question, an objecting school might raise
arguments similar to those mentioned in part II-A: that a condition on what a school receiving
vouchers may teach is a form of viewpoint discrimination in the distribution of state benefits, and
that under the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” the state may not require a voucher recip-
ient or participating school to give up constitutional rights of expression, association and religious
exercise as the price of participating in a state benefit program.
Again, the state will likely rely on several Supreme Court decisions that give the government sub-
stantial power to place conditions on persons or organizations that it subsidizes. For example,
Rust v. Sullivan30 permitted the government, under a program funding family planning, to pro-
hibit projects receiving funds from discussing abortion, on the ground that the government could
choose the policy it favored without having to fund the alternative. The state will likely analogize
In a third category are provisions that forbid the “compelled support of [religious] worship or
instruction,” or forbid state money to be “appropriated for or applied to religious worship or
instruction.” Even if such phrasing were interpreted to forbid voucher aid to the religious teaching
in a religious school, it might nevertheless allow the state to support a distinct or separable secu-
lar education component. If that is so, the questions would be whether the state court views reli-
gious schools as having such a separable secular component, and whether tuition vouchers could
be so limited – whether by restricting their size, requiring the school to segregate accounts or
requiring the school to separate tax-funded activities from religious ones.
2. Federal Challenges to State Provisions. If a state enacts a voucher program and excludes reli-
gious schools from participation (whether because of a state constitutional provision or a policy
judgment), the exclusion is likely to be challenged under several federal constitutional provisions.
The federal argument then would be that religious schools are not merely permitted, but have a
right, to participate in the program if secular private schools are included.
Two lines of argument are likely to be prominent in the federal challenges to state restrictions.
The first is that the exclusion of religious schools from a voucher program discriminates against
religion and so violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause (as a form of “viewpoint
discrimination” against religion) and/or the Equal Protection Clause.22 The challengers will argue
that once the government offers benefits for private education, to withhold such benefits for those
who choose schools with religious viewpoints – including benefits for the secular educational
value those schools provide – is to penalize the exercise of constitutional rights.23
Those defending the state restrictions are likely to make a number of counterarguments. In particu-
lar, they will rely on several decisions holding that the state need not subsidize the exercise of
constitutional rights (here, the choice of a religious education)24 even if it subsidizes alternative
conduct (here, the choice of a secular education).25 They will argue that excluding religious
schools does not unconstitutionally penalize that choice, because government may refuse to fund
programs that choose to merge conduct the state does not intend to subsidize (the practice of reli-
gion) with activities the state has an interest in subsidizing (the provision of a secular education).26
The second likely argument challenging state anti-aid provisions is that many of them are consti-
tutionally tainted because their enactment was substantially motivated by 19th century Protestant
and nativist hostility toward the growing Catholic population and Catholic school system. Four
current Supreme Court justices have joined an opinion reviewing the history and have concluded
in strong terms that bans on aid to sectarian schools have often reflected anti-Catholic animus.27
Those defending the state restrictions will likely make several counterarguments, including, first,
that some of the state restrictions predate the 19th-century anti-Catholic movement and thus are
not tainted by it; second, that determining the original motive of an enactment is a difficult and
problematic inquiry, and that courts often refuse to accept evidence of bad motive as the basis for
invalidating an otherwise constitutional law; and third, that even those state provisions originally
11
Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes
10
School Vouchers
forbidden by any constitutional provision. If an exemption is given to religious schools but not
secular private schools, a challenger will likely argue that this violates the Establishment Clause as
interpreted in Zelman, since one of the prime features in upholding the Cleveland program was
its neutrality – that it had the same terms for religious as for nonreligious schools.34 The chal-
lengers may also claim that the exemption violates the same free speech principles of viewpoint
neutrality cited by voucher proponents challenging state constitutional limits on aid to religious
schools. In response, defenders of religious exemptions will likely argue that the overriding crite-
rion in Zelman is not neutrality in the sense of the same facial terms, but rather whether the pro-
gram skews the choices of individuals toward religious schools – and then argue that a particular
exemption for religious schools does not so skew the choices.
Conclusion
The Court has announced well-defined criteria for measuring whether a program of elementary
and secondary school vouchers satisfies the Establishment Clause. Although there may be litiga-
tion over what constitutes a “genuine” secular alternative, for the most part state and local offi-
cials who choose to create voucher programs can look to Zelman for guideposts on how to draft
a valid program that includes religious schools as participants. But on the other issues we have
identified – state constitutional restrictions on educational aid and questions concerning the con-
ditions accompanying voucher programs – Zelman says little or nothing. It will likely take years
to resolve these issues in various courts and, as to the remaining federal constitutional issues, per-
haps ultimately in the Supreme Court again.
a voucher program to Rust, arguing that, because the state is funding the education of children, it
may determine the content of the educational program it chooses to subsidize.31
The objecting school or individual will likely respond by analogizing vouchers to the funding pro-
gram in Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia,32 which held that it was unconstitutional for a
state university to exclude a student publication, because of its viewpoint, from a benefit available
to a wide range of student expressive organizations. The religious school would likely claim that
vouchers are analogous because they are redeemable at a wide range of schools and because
they place educational decisions in the hands of parents rather than the state – both features that
Zelman emphasized. The state would likely reply by arguing that Rosenberger is a limited deci-
sion involving an unusual case – a university’s policy of funding a wide range of student speech
without general concern for its content – that is unlike a state’s decision to pursue educational
goals through an elementary and secondary-school voucher program.
Even if a religious school is able to assert constitutional rights against voucher conditions, the
question is just what those constitutional rights would be. Could a participating school challenge
the Cleveland condition that it not teach “hatred of any person or group” based on ethnicity or
religion? Could a religious pacifist high school challenge a condition that no participating school
teach students to refuse to serve in the military? Could a participating religious school that
opposes homosexual behavior refuse to hire an openly gay person as a principal – or a teacher –
or refuse to admit an openly gay student if the voucher program has a condition prohibiting
sexual-orientation discrimination?33 Future rounds of litigation may feature questions like these.
The other condition in the Cleveland program – that participating schools not discriminate on
the basis of religion – raises one of the issues that divides the signers of this statement. Some of
us believe, and courts may hold, that a religious school that prefers members of its faith as
employees is exercising not a special right, but the same right that other ideological organiza-
tions have to ensure that their employees are committed to the organization’s mission. Under
this view, a religious school should retain this right even when it participates in a voucher pro-
gram. Others of us believe, and courts may hold, that as to non-leadership positions, discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion, like discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity and other
characteristics recognized by civil rights laws, is a practice of concern to society because of its
potential to limit the opportunities of members of minority groups. Under this view, the state
may (or even must) impose a general condition limiting such preferences by schools that benefit
from state funds, including religious schools. A third possibility is that a court may rule that an
anti-discrimination prohibition is appropriate or even necessary vis-à-vis employees teaching sec-
ular subjects and yet find that such a prohibition should not apply to leadership positions and
those teaching religious subjects.
2. Constitutional Objections to Exemption. If a state itself exempts religious schools from a certain
condition on a voucher program, the question then becomes whether the statutory exemption is
13
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31. See also Maher, 432 U.S. 464; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
32. 515 U.S. 819.
33. Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Such a claim would raise questions about whether the associa-
tional right in Dale, which involved a direct prohibition on sexual-orientation discrimination in leadership positions,
extends to the selection of teachers and others. It is also unclear whether the associational right in Dale extends to
anti-discrimination conditions attached to funding. Contrast Dale with Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76
(1984) (upholding conditions against First Amendment challenge).
34. See supra part I-B-1.
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I urge this step forward because vouchers show signs of being able to enhance African-American
test scores with few adverse consequences for others. Let us review the evidence.
Vouchers Today
School vouchers provide parents with a sum of money that can be used to pay part or all of the
tuition at their chosen private school, religious or secular. So defined, there are in the United
States numerous privately funded voucher programs paying approximately half the tuition for
more than 50,000 students in New York City, Washington, D. C., Dayton, Ohio, and many other
cities across the country. These private programs have generated valuable information, discussed
later in this essay, about the way in which such programs can benefit inner-city African-
Americans. But the voucher programs that have received the most public attention are three pub-
licly funded ones enrolling nearly 20,000 students in Milwaukee, Cleveland and Florida.
The oldest program, established in Milwaukee in 1990 at the urging of local black leaders and
Governor Tommy Thompson, was originally restricted to secular private schools and to fewer
than 1,000 students. The Wisconsin legislature expanded Milwaukee’s voucher program in 1995 to
allow parochial schools to participate; the move led to court challenges based on church-state
separation. In 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the expanded
voucher program; the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the decision. That allowed voucher
students in the city to attend religious schools as well. Nearly 11,000 students, more than 15 per-
cent of the eligible population, will be receiving vouchers for up to $5,785 for the 2002-03 school
year, making it the country’s largest and most firmly established voucher program.
The Cleveland program, enacted in 1996, was of lesser significance until the Supreme Court
made it famous. Vouchers are for no more than $2,250 and have been limited to approximately
4,000 students.
The Florida program, established in 1999 after Governor Jeb Bush had campaigned on the issue,
initially had fewer than 100 students but is poised to become somewhat larger. Here, vouchers
are offered to students attending failing public schools. Initially, only two schools in Pensacola
were said to be failing, but more are scheduled to join their ranks in September. Also, nearly
4,000 special education students in Florida are using vouchers. (The program is still operating
despite a recent ruling by a Florida circuit court judge that the program violates the Florida
Constitution by providing indirect state aid to religion. The decision has been stayed while it is
being appealed.)
In other words, much can be learned from existing privately and publicly funded voucher pro-
grams, but all are limited in size and funded at modest levels. Larger, well-funded pilot programs,
with the potential of serving all residents in a central city, would greatly expand our knowledge
of the efficacy of this reform strategy for closing the education gap between blacks and whites.
A Call for Citywide Voucher
Demonstration Programs 
Paul E. Peterson, Harvard University 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Cleveland school voucher case, the Supreme Court found that
vouchers do not violate the Establishment of Religion Clause of the U.S. Constitution because they
allow parents a choice of school, whether religious or secular. Now that vouchers have passed
this crucial constitutional test, it’s time to try them out on a larger scale. State governments, per-
haps with support from the federal government, should establish citywide voucher programs in
two or three cities that would allow residents of the city to have their choice of school, public or
private, religious or secular, either within or outside central-city boundaries.
Designed properly, such a pilot program holds the promise of helping to close the education gap
between black and white Americans. To make the pilot program as effective as possible, the
budget for the pilot city’s school children, both public school and voucher students, should be
increased by 50 percent – from the approximately $8,830 per pupil spent, on average, in 2000-01
nationwide to the more than $13,000 per pupil that some of the most exclusive suburban school
districts enjoy. Were these sums made available, vouchers could be combined with salary
increases for teachers, smaller classes, better facilities and other educational innovations. Ideally,
the cities selected for the intervention would contain large African-American populations.
By combining vouchers with dramatically enlarged expenditures, this approach would transcend
the partisan conflict between Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, union lead-
ers and market theorists. One would no longer be choosing between committing more resources
to education and asking schools to be more efficient. The pilot program would instead acknowl-
edge the strength of both the liberal and conservative sides of this argument. At the same time, it
would help answer several genuinely important questions: Can vouchers, properly designed,
improve inner-city schools? Can vouchers close the education gap between blacks and whites?
Can vouchers help revive the central city?
Paul E. Peterson is the Shattuck Professor of Government, Director of the Program on Education
Policy and Governance at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution,
Stanford University. He is coauthor of The Education Gap: Vouchers and Urban Schools
(Brookings, 2002).
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of private school, scored significantly higher on standardized tests than comparable students remain-
ing in public school. In New York, where estimates are most precise, African-American students
who switched from public to private schools tested, after three years, roughly 9 percentage points
higher than African-Americans in public schools. This difference is roughly two grade levels and
about half a standard deviation and equals the size of the black-white test-score gap nationwide.
These test-score gains were accomplished at religious and other private schools that had much
less money than that available to New York’s public schools. Data available from the state of New
York reveals that New York City’s public schools have twice as much money per pupil as the
city’s Catholic schools – even after deducting amounts spent on the food lunch program, special
education, transportation-related expenditures and the cost of the city’s massive public school
bureaucracy. With so little money, these schools did not have fancy buildings and playgrounds.
Indeed, private school parents reported fewer facilities and programs at their child’s school than
public school parents did.
Yet private school parents also reported much higher levels of school satisfaction than their public
school peers. Private school parents also were more likely to report that their children had
smaller schools, smaller classes and an education-friendly environment (less fighting, cheating,
property destruction, truancy, tardiness and racial conflict). Their children had more homework
and the schools were more likely to communicate with the family. Nor were the private schools
any more segregated than the public ones.
There was no evidence that vouchers improved the test scores of students from other ethnic
groups, however. Vouchers did not have a significant impact, positive or negative, on the test
scores of either whites in Dayton or Latinos in New York City. (The number of non-African-
Americans in the D.C. study was too small to facilitate inter-ethnic comparisons.) 
These findings are all the more important, I believe, because they come from randomized field
trials similar to the placebo trials conducted in medical research, generally regarded as the gold
standard of scientific research. Yet the results from these randomized field trials do not so much
break new ground as confirm findings from other studies. Two recent reviews of the literature
have concluded that private schools are particularly beneficial for African-Americans. Princeton
economist Cecilia Rouse found, “Catholic schools generate higher test scores for African-
Americans,” though the results for white students are not so clear. Similarly, Jeffrey Grogger and
Derek Neal, economists from the University of Wisconsin and University of Chicago, find that
“urban minorities in Catholic schools fare much better than similar students in public schools,” but
the effects for urban whites and suburban students generally are “at best mixed.”
It is little wonder that many African-Americans are among those most eager to find alternatives to
traditional neighborhood public schools. Even though most civil rights leaders have yet to
endorse school choice, their constituents are leading the way. In 1998, a nonpartisan research
The Case for Central-City Pilot Voucher Programs 
Despite a host of compensatory education reforms, the education gap has remained intact for
decades. Although there were signs that the gap had begun to close during the 1980s, it opened
up again during the 1990s, leaving us not far from where we were at the beginning of the civil
rights revolution. In 1999, the math test scores on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), commonly known as “the nation’s report card,” were, on average, 237 points for
9-year-old white students, the same as average black test scores at age 13. The test scores for 17-
year-old African-American students were, on average, 282 points, as compared with 315 points for
white students. This difference is better than one standard deviation difference, generally thought
to be a very large difference.
Nor is this gap likely to close if most middle- and upper-income families can pick their school by
moving into a desired neighborhood or using a private school, while low-income families cannot
easily do so. School choice is already part and parcel of the American educational system. Every
time parents identify a neighborhood to live in, they select a school for their child – often self-
consciously. According to a recent survey, 45 percent of whites (as compared with 22 percent of
African-Americans) consider “the quality of the public schools” when deciding where to live.
The choosing is becoming ever more sophisticated and pervasive. Web-based firms now provide
home buyers with test scores and other detailed information on any school or district a family
wants to learn about. But choosing a school costs money, the kind of money it takes to make a
down payment and follow through on a monthly mortgage. The only thing equal about public
education today is the equal insistence that one buy into a community if you want your children
to attend its school. So it is not an accident that children lucky enough to be born into privilege
attend the nation’s best schools. Indeed, given the structure of public education, it’s a foreor-
dained conclusion.
African-Americans are the losers in this arrangement. Holding less equity and facing discrimina-
tion in the housing market, blacks choose from a limited set of housing options. As a conse-
quence, their children attend the worst public schools. Richer, whiter districts rarely extend
anything more than a few token slots to minority students outside their community of privilege.
Like robins protecting their nests, the well-to-do guard their schools. The results are clear. Despite
the efforts of the civil rights movement, public schools today remain almost as segregated as they
were in the 1950s. According to the most recent data available, in the school attended by the
average African-American, only a third of the students are white.
Since blacks have the least amount of choice among public schools, they benefit the most when
choice is expanded. In multi-year evaluations of private voucher programs in New York City,
Washington, D.C., and Dayton, Ohio, published as The Education Gap: Vouchers and Urban Schools
(Brookings 2002), my colleagues and I found that African-American students, when given a choice
21
Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes
20
School Vouchers
during the 1998-99 school year did not differ materially from that of students remaining in public
schools. Similarly, a University of Wisconsin evaluation of an earlier, smaller voucher program in
Milwaukee found few consistent test score differences or family background differences between
those who took vouchers and those who remained in public schools. Analysts at the University of
Indiana who evaluated the Cleveland program found that voucher “students, like their families,
are very similar to their public school counterparts.” In short, vouchers tend to recruit a cross-sec-
tion of the families and students eligible for participation. 
Upon reflection, these findings are not particularly surprising. Families are more likely to want to
opt out of a school if their child is doing badly than if that child is doing well. A number of fami-
lies, moreover, select a private school because they like the religious education it provides, or
because it is safe or because they like the discipline. When all these factors operate simultane-
ously, the type of student who takes a voucher usually looks little different from those who pass
up the opportunity.
Does public school performance suffer? If vouchers do not simply pick off the top students within
the public schools but attract a cross-section of students, then there is no obvious educational
reason why public schools should suffer as a result of the initiative. On the contrary, public
schools, confronted by the possibility that they could lose substantial numbers of students to com-
peting schools within the community, might well pull up their socks and reach out more effec-
tively to those they are serving. Interestingly enough, there is already some evidence that public
schools do exactly that.
Harvard economist Caroline M. Hoxby has shown, for example, that since the Milwaukee voucher
program was expanded on a larger scale in 1998, it has had a positive impact on public school
test scores. Public school scores in low-income neighborhoods most impacted by the voucher
program improved more than scores in areas of Milwaukee and elsewhere in Wisconsin not
affected by the voucher program. She also found a similar positive impact of charter school com-
petition on public school test scores in Michigan and Arizona, the two states in the country with
the largest number of students attending charter schools. In other words, when substantial num-
bers of students are using vouchers or going to charter schools, public schools in the vicinity
apparently respond by improving their educational offerings and, as a result, public school per-
formance is enhanced.
Even the threat of a voucher can have a positive effect on test scores. Research by Manhattan
Institute scholar Jay Greene shows that when public schools were in danger of failing twice on the
statewide Florida exam, making their students eligible for vouchers, these public schools made spe-
cial efforts to avoid failure. Their test scores improved more than other schools that had D-minus
test scores but were not threatened by vouchers. Greene was able to rule out the possibility that
the improvements were the result of the additional resources made available to the failing schools.
In other words, competition — even the threat of competition — had positive effects in Florida.
group, Public Agenda, found that 59 percent of white parents supported vouchers but 72 percent
of African-American parents did. In 2000, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
reported that 57 percent of African-American adults favored vouchers, as compared with 49 per-
cent of the overall population.
No Child Left Behind
But what about those students left behind in traditional public schools? Even if students attending
private schools are better off, won’t those remaining in public schools be adversely affected? Like
Caesar’s Gaul, this question can be divided into three parts. Do vouchers attract the best and
brightest from public schools? Does public school performance suffer? Do public schools lose crit-
ically important fiscal resources? Let’s consider each question separately.
Do vouchers attract the best and the brightest from public schools? My own research has looked at
this question in two different ways. In one study, my colleagues and I compared a random
sample of all those who applied for a voucher offered nationwide by the Children’s Scholarship
Fund with a national cross-section of all those eligible to apply. African-American students were
twice as likely to apply as others. Specifically, 49 percent of the applicants were African-
American, even though they constituted just 26 percent of the eligible population. Other results
reveal little sign that the interest in vouchers is limited to only the most talented.
On the contrary, voucher applicants were just as likely to have a child who had a learning dis-
ability as all those in the eligible population. Nor is it only the better-educated families who take
an interest. Twenty-three percent of the mothers of applicants said they had graduated from col-
lege, as compared with 20 percent of the mothers in the eligible population. 
In a second study, this time of vouchers in New York, Washington, D. C., and Dayton, my col-
leagues and I looked at those who actually made use of vouchers when they were offered to
them. We did not find any evidence that private schools discriminated on the basis of a young
student’s test score performance at the time they received an application from a voucher recipi-
ent. Among young applicants in New York City and Washington, D. C., there were no significant
differences in the test scores at the time of application between voucher users and those who
turned down the voucher and remained in public school. In Dayton, those using the voucher had
lower math scores at the time of application, showing even more clearly that private schools were
willing to accept educationally challenged students. Only among older students (grades 6-8) in
Washington, D. C., did we see some signs that private schools expected students to meet a mini-
mum educational standard prior to admission.
Other researchers find much the same pattern. In Milwaukee, the Wisconsin Legislative Audit
Bureau found that the ethnic composition of the participants in Milwaukee’s voucher program
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much larger than those currently available will attract new entrepreneurs to education, both
nonprofits and for-profits. Existing private schools will be as challenged as public schools by
new, energetic educators.
Why Pilot Programs Should Be Open to All 
Central-City Students 
Until now, all voucher programs have been limited to students from low-income families. While
this may have been appropriate for initial demonstration programs, a larger program should not
encourage segregation of students by income. Instead, programs should be designed to encour-
age both public and private school integration, both economically and socially. For this to
happen, vouchers need to be generally available.
A citywide voucher program may also entice some of the middle- and working-class families who
often leave cities because of the low quality of urban schools. Gentrification has restored a
number of urban neighborhoods in a few parts of the country, but city life has proven mainly
attractive to young people, oldsters and tourists, folks who need not worry about school quality.
Unfortunately, many young couples leave the city they enjoy simply because they cannot bear the
thought of placing their children in a public school — and a private school is beyond their
means. Vouchers would provide an option for such families. If enough are enticed to remain in
the city, schools will gradually become better integrated — and central cities will be revitalized.
Balkanization: Myth, Not Reality
Whatever the advantages of vouchers, some may feel that they would prove divisive in a pluralist
society with multiple religious traditions. In his dissent from the majority opinion in Zelman,
Justice Stephen Breyer saw the decision as risking a “struggle of sect against sect.” And Justice
John Stevens in his dissenting opinion said he had reached his decision by reflecting on the
“decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland and the Middle East to mistrust one
another…[With this decision] we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of
our democracy.”
These dissents echo the concerns of many distressed by the worldwide rise in fundamentalist reli-
gious conviction, worries that have intensified since 9/11. Though the concerns are genuine
enough, it’s hardly clear that government-controlled indoctrination of young people is the best
tool for conquering intolerance. On the contrary, this strategy proved counterproductive in many
parts of the former Soviet Union. Historically, the United States has achieved religious peace not
by imposing a common culture but by ensuring that all creeds, even those judged as dangerous
by the enlightened, have equal access to democratic processes.
One can look at the impact of choice on public schools over the long run by comparing student
performance across metropolitan areas with varying numbers of private schools. The more private
schools there are, the more the competition and the greater the impact on public schools. If the
presence of private schools undermines public schools, then one would expect to find lower
public school performance in those metropolitan areas where private schools abound. But a
Harvard study has shown exactly the opposite: Public school students do better in those parts of
the country where there is more ready access to private schools. Similarly, some metropolitan areas
have more school districts than others, giving parents the option to choose among different public
school systems by moving to the neighborhood of choice. Knowing that this type of parental
choice can affect community property values, school boards may respond by providing parents
with better quality education for their children. Research shows that this in fact happens, that in
those metropolitan areas with more school districts, students are given more demanding academic
courses, school sports are given less emphasis, costs are reigned in and students learn more.
Do public schools lose critically important fiscal resources? To see how school vouchers affect the
fiscal resources available to public school children, the structure of public school financing needs
to be briefly considered. Although the financial arrangements vary from one state to the next, on
average, nationwide, 49 percent of the revenue for public elementary and secondary schools
comes from state governments, while 44 percent is collected from local sources and the balance
is received in grants from the federal government. Most of the revenue school districts get from
state governments is distributed on a “follow the child” principle: The more students in a district,
the more money it receives from the state; if a child moves to another district, the state money
follows the child. However, local revenue, most of which comes from local property taxes, stays
in the district no matter where the child goes. As a result, the amount of money the district has
per pupil actually increases if a district suffers a net loss of students, simply because local rev-
enues are spread over fewer pupils.
The voucher programs in Milwaukee, Cleveland and Florida have been designed along similar
lines. The state money follows the child, but the local revenue stays behind in local public
schools, which means that more money is available per pupil. In Milwaukee, per-pupil expendi-
tures for public school children increased by 22 percent between 1990 and 1999, rising from
$7,559 to $9,036. Not all of the increase was a direct result of the voucher program, but the case
disproves any claim that public schools necessarily suffer financially when voucher programs are
put into effect.
Though voucher programs have been designed to be fiscally advantageous to public school
children, a central-city pilot program should do even more. It should be designed to enhance
resources available to public and private schools alike. If funds for public schools are greatly
enhanced, they will be given every opportunity to respond effectively to the competition pri-
vate schools pose. And given the competition, public schools will have strong incentives to
make effective — and efficient — use of the extra monies. At the same time, vouchers that are
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Of course, religious conflict is part and parcel of American political history. In the late 19th cen-
tury, many objected to the establishment of Catholic schools – indeed, anti-immigrant sentiment
was so strong that amendments were added to state constitutions that seemed to forbid aid to
religious schools. Those seeking to forestall voucher initiatives still are invoking these amend-
ments today.
Yet religious schools hardly teach un-Americanism. Careful studies show that students educated in
Catholic schools are both more engaged in political and community life and more tolerant of
others than public school students. After enduring harsh criticism in a Protestant-dominated
America, Catholic schools took special pains to teach democratic values. The more recently estab-
lished Christian schools, as well as Jewish and Muslim schools, can be expected to make similar
attempts to prove they, too, can create good citizens.
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion, if Breyer’s and Steven’s
fears were real, we would know it already. She showed that taxpayer dollars flow to religious
institutions in multiple ways – through Pell Grants to students who attend sectarian colleges and
universities, via child-care programs in which churches, synagogues and other religious institu-
tions may participate and through direct aid to parochial schools of computers and other instruc-
tional materials. If thriving religious institutions create a Balkanized country, she seems to say, this
would already have happened. 
Nor do public schools necessarily spread tolerance and respect for the rights of others. One hun-
dred years of public education in the South did little for white tolerance of African-Americans. As
Justice Clarence Thomas argued in his concurring opinion, “The failure to provide education to
poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality and alienation
that continues for the remainder of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it
can arm minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of discrimination’s effects.”
In other words, vouchers may be able to heal, not intensify, the country’s most serious social divi-
sion. At the very least, we should give the idea a try in a few, well-designed pilot programs in
large central cities under circumstances where both public and private schools can thrive.
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This paper examines some of the key questions states and localities should address when consid-
ering voucher programs.
Do school voucher plans improve students’ 
educational performance?
The opinions by both Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas in the
Cleveland voucher ruling explicitly invoke the “failure” of Cleveland’s public schools to educate
poor urban children. “[T]he promise of public school education has failed poor inner-city blacks,”
Thomas wrote. “While in theory providing education to everyone, the quality of public schools
varies significantly across districts…[M]any blacks and other minorities now support school choice
programs because they provide the greatest educational opportunities for their children in strug-
gling communities.”
The implication of Thomas’ remark is that urban minority children will perform significantly better
in private schools, including religious ones. In Cleveland, however, this turns out not to be true.
Kim Metcalf at the University of Indiana has led a series of studies evaluating the Cleveland pro-
gram since it took effect in the 1996-97 school year. These studies have been widely reviewed by
both voucher proponents and opponents. Metcalf’s research shows that educational gains for
voucher students are small, if they exist at all. In his latest study, Metcalf compared students who
received vouchers with public school students who had applied for a voucher but did not get
one because not enough were available. Metcalf found no difference in test scores between the
two groups. He also compared voucher students in private schools with public school students
who did not apply for a voucher. The voucher students scored slightly better in language arts but
not in math or reading.
Metcalf’s research also suggests that new, for-profit private schools entering inner-city voucher
markets may actually have worse academic records than “failing” public schools. In the first years
of the Cleveland program, about 800 students attended two for-profit private schools, called the
Hope Schools, started by entrepreneur and voucher advocate David Brennan. Metcalf found test
scores for the students at the Hope Schools declined compared with students in public schools.
At the same time, scores for voucher students in private religious schools increased at about the
same rate as scores for public school students.
Cleveland’s voucher plan was not the first school choice program in the nation. Milwaukee estab-
lished its voucher program in 1990. In its initial experimental phase, vouchers in Milwaukee were
limited to non-religious schools. At first, only several hundred students received vouchers, which
they used to attend seven private schools. As the voucher amount rose from $2,500 in 1991 to
$5,500 in 1994-95, the numbers increased to 830 students in 12 schools. 
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in the International and Comparative Education and Economics of Education programs.
Currently, he heads Stanford’s effort in a project studying accountability in U.S. schools. His recent
works include Sustaining the New Economy, published by Harvard University Press, and All Else
Equal: Are Public and Private Schools Different? (with Luis Benveniste and Richard Rothstein) to
be published by Rutledge in December, 2002.
Should States Implement Vouchers
Even If They Are Constitutional? 
Martin Carnoy, Stanford University 
The United States Supreme Court decision upholding Cleveland’s voucher program removed the
major federal constitutional obstacle to public funding of private religious schools. But states and
localities still must decide whether shifting tax revenues to private schools is the best way to
improve their educational systems.
A wide range of studies on the workings of different types of voucher plans suggest that vouch-
ers are not the best way to improve education. These studies focus on the two major public
voucher programs in the United States – one in Cleveland and a larger program in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin – and on smaller voucher experiments in several other U.S. cities and nationwide
voucher plans in Chile and New Zealand.
The results from these studies are remarkably consistent. They show that the academic gains for
voucher students are minimal at best, and often non-existent. In fact, when the studies in the
United States, Chile and New Zealand are added up, it is impossible to conclude that vouchers
will improve students’ academic performance, even if these students are from low-income families
and attend the lowest-performing public schools. Indeed, if we take the U.S. results at face value,
Latino students do not benefit significantly from vouchers, and only a small percentage of African-
American students make any significant gains by transferring to private schools. Educational
strategies that produce such insignificant results are not worth the risk, especially if they divert
money and attention from the nation’s public schools – the schools attended by 90 percent of all
U.S. school children. States and localities that want to improve the nation’s poorest-performing
public schools should focus instead on policies with better track records, such as increasing
teacher content knowledge, providing high quality pre-school education to low-income children,
reducing class sizes, raising standards and increasing school accountability.
29
Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes
28
School Vouchers
The Latino cohort in New York City, which represented more than half of the voucher students in
the New York sample, consistently showed no significant gains over the three years of the study.
The African-American voucher students in New York did show significant test score gains in math
and reading compared with public school students, but these gains were concentrated in two
cohorts — those voucher students who began fourth and fifth grades in the first year of the
experiment. By the third year, however, only 226 students in the New York City sample remained
in these two cohorts, out of a total of 1,440 voucher students who participated in the first year of
the New York experiment, and a total of 2,774 voucher students who began in the first year of
the experiment in all three cities.
Thus, whatever claims are made for voucher student gains in the three city experiments — and
these claims abound from voucher proponents — they are based on statistically significant results
for 226 students, or only 8 percent, of the almost 2,800 students in all three cities who used
vouchers in private schools. Even if Latino and other non-black students were excluded from the
evaluation, there only were significant educational performance gains among 12 percent of the
African-American students who used vouchers in the three cities.
There is also a theoretical problem with the African-American gains that come from this disaggre-
gation. The randomized studies did not randomize by race. The only randomization was for the
group as a whole in each city. There was no significant effect for the group as a whole in any of
the three cities.
Voucher proponents interpret these results as being a very positive finding. While it is interesting
that some voucher students were able to make significant gains, the overall result of the experi-
ments is far more modest than claimed by voucher proponents.
The largest voucher plans are found outside the United States. The most researched program is in
Chile. Since 1981, all students in Chile have been eligible to receive vouchers that can be used
either in private or public schools. In 1980, before the voucher program was enacted, about 20
percent of Chilean pupils in kindergarten through eighth grade were in private schools. By the
early 1990s, 43 percent of K-8 students in Chile were attending private schools, both voucher
schools and independent schools, which do not accept vouchers. Many private school students –
36 percent of the 43 percent – attend private schools that accept vouchers. Of those who attend
private voucher schools, one-third attends religious schools and two-thirds attend non-religious
private schools organized for profit.
The Chilean experience is interesting because it reveals how education markets work when par-
ents have a choice in a system with many private schools, and where private schools are largely
unregulated. During the 1980s, there was not even a teachers’ union in Chile to “impede” educa-
tional innovation. Despite such conditions, this “free market” in education did not produce the
predicted results:
With turnover rates of 30 percent among voucher students — about the same turnover rate as in
Milwaukee’s public schools — comparing the performance of voucher and public school students
in Milwaukee was methodologically complex. This resulted in major disputes among educational
researchers, including Harvard’s Paul Peterson, Wisconsin’s John Witte and Princeton’s Cecilia
Rouse. Reviewing their findings, it appears that the positive gains for voucher students in
Milwaukee were small, at best. For example, Rouse estimated a small relative gain in math scores
for Milwaukee’s voucher students in the third and fourth years, but no gains in reading scores or
in math for students who spent less than three years in voucher schools. She also estimated that
students in a Milwaukee public magnet school program with smaller class sizes had much larger
gains in educational performance than did voucher students in private schools.
In 1995 the Wisconsin legislature voted to expand Milwaukee’s voucher program to include reli-
gious schools and raised the number of eligible low-income students to 15,000. (The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the expanded program in 1998.) Initially, about
8,000 students applied for the vouchers, which remained at $5,500, about the cost of Milwaukee’s
per-pupil spending on primary education. One-third of the voucher-takers under this expanded
program were already in private schools, but they qualified for vouchers because of low family
incomes. By the 2001-02 school year, about 10,000 children were using vouchers at more than
100 private schools, 80 percent of which were religious schools. This makes Milwaukee the single
largest voucher program in the United States. Yet it is difficult to tell whether voucher students
are performing better than other students, partly because test scores have not been collected
since the 1994-95 school year, when the program was limited to secular schools and had rela-
tively few participants. The legislature dropped testing and evaluation requirements for participat-
ing schools when it expanded the program in 1995. Unlike public school students, voucher
students are not required to take state tests.
By the late 1990s, small, privately financed voucher experiments were operating in New York City,
Dayton, Ohio, and Washington, D.C. The amount of the voucher in the three cities is relatively
small, ranging from $1,500 to $1,700. These voucher experiments had built-in evaluation require-
ments, based on an experimental design. Students were assigned vouchers at random from a pool
of low-income applicants. Voucher recipients who went to private schools and non-recipients who
stayed in public schools were tested annually to measure achievement gains.  The researchers
studying the experiments claim that such random assignments allow for unbiased comparisons of
educational progress by low-income students attending both private and public schools.
As in Cleveland, the results from the three cities indicate that academic gains associated with vouch-
ers are small or non-existent. In the latest, third-year round of studies, Dayton had to be eliminated
from the study because so few students remained in the voucher program for all three years that
the statistical results were insignificant. The largely African-American cohort of voucher students in
Washington, D.C., who had shown the largest gains in the second year follow-up, showed no signif-
icant gains in either math or reading scores after three years. Their earlier gains disappeared.
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Logically, then, it would seem that competition should have a positive effect on student perform-
ance. But if there is a competition effect, it seems to be a small one. Columbia University’s Clive
Belfield and Henry M. Levin have reviewed a host of studies on school performance in the United
States, and they conclude that the benefits of competition are largely insignificant. “Increased
competition and higher educational quality are positively correlated,” they write. “However ….the
effects of competition on educational outcomes appear substantively modest; between one-third
and two-thirds of the estimates lack statistical significance…”
Voucher proponents cite a study by Jay Greene, a researcher at the Manhattan Institute, that
examined the effects of Florida’s “A-Plus Accountability and School Choice Program,” which pro-
vided vouchers to students attending public schools that received a failing grade in state evalua-
tions for two out of four previous years. According to Kenneth Jost, staff writer for Congressional
Quarterly, Greene “found evidence that schools that received a failing grade in 1999 – and thus
faced the threat of vouchers – achieved test-score gains more than twice those recorded at other
schools in Florida.” But Gregory Camilli and Katrina Bulkley of Rutgers University argue that
Greene “vastly overestimated” the test score gains in the Florida program, which was recently
struck down by a Florida circuit court judge as a violation of the state constitution. (The decision
was suspended while it is being appealed.)
More problematic, Greene attributed the increase in test scores to the threat of vouchers when
there was no direct relation between the two. Research I did with the Economic Policy Institute
shows that in the year before Florida’s A-Plus program was implemented, before there was a
voucher “threat,” Florida schools branded as failing also had higher test-score increases than
other schools. Lowest-scoring (“failing”) schools in Texas and North Carolina, states with high-
stakes accountability systems but no vouchers, also had the highest test score gains in the
late 1990s.
Harvard economics professor Caroline M. Hoxby has studied academic performance in
Milwaukee’s public schools since the city’s voucher experiment expanded in the late 1990s.
According to Jost, she found “above-average gains in many of the schools – and particularly high
gains in schools in low-income neighborhoods that she said faced the greatest ‘competition’ from
vouchers.” “Overall, … public schools made a strong push to improve achievement in the face of
competition from vouchers,” Hoxby wrote in a 2001 paper on her study. 
Yet, in the same study, Hoxby found no similar effect in public schools in two other sites she
analyzed — Arizona and Michigan — where public schools face competition from charter
schools. Neither does she provide evidence that the Milwaukee schools with the largest increases
in test scores were the ones facing “the greatest competition from vouchers.” Rather, she
assumes that public schools in the lowest-income neighborhoods are losing the most students to
private competitors.
• There is no evidence that student test scores in math and language arts improved during the
long voucher era, 1981-2000.
• There is strong evidence that pupils in public schools with similar socioeconomic backgrounds
to those in private voucher schools do as well or better on national tests.
• Students in Catholic voucher schools do somewhat better than students in public schools, and
students in for-profit voucher schools do somewhat worse.
• The lower the socioeconomic background of the comparison voucher and public school students,
the worse the private voucher school students score compared with public school students.
Chile’s voucher experience has some sobering implications for the United States. In U.S. voucher
experiments, including the one in Cleveland, low-income voucher students usually attend estab-
lished private schools, mainly religious ones. Generally, the private schools accept just a few new
voucher students at a time. Taking a few new low-income students into a school with students
from somewhat higher socioeconomic backgrounds usually creates the most favorable conditions
for voucher students’ academic improvement because of the positive effect that the other private
school students have on the voucher students. Once there are more students from very low-
income families in religious schools, there will be less improvement.
The Chilean case also suggests that in larger voucher programs where new, for-profit private
schools enter the unregulated market, low-income voucher students attending such schools might
learn less than if they had stayed in public schools. The Hope Schools in Cleveland are this type
of school and their test score data were lower than those in Cleveland’s “failing” public schools.
We do not have the test score data for students in Milwaukee’s expanded voucher program, but
the results in Cleveland and Chile suggest that we might well find voucher students in the many
new for-profit private schools scoring lower than in Milwaukee’s public schools.
Do vouchers encourage public schools to improve
because of increased competition?
Even if voucher students do not make significant gains in test scores when they switch to private
schools, allowing families to choose among educational alternatives might force poorly perform-
ing public schools to do a better job. Proponents have long made this a centerpiece of their argu-
ments in support of vouchers. They contend that when public schools have a monopoly on local
education, they can get away with delivering low-quality education and still maintain revenues.
When public schools have to compete for students, in order to hold on to state funding, school
officials and teachers would have the incentive to insure that students learn, that the school runs
smoothly and that parents are satisfied.
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Together with Wellesley economist Patrick McEwan, I have examined statistical data on the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of private schools in Chile’s voucher system over a 20-year period. We
found no greater improvement in public school test scores in those municipalities where public
schools had more intense competition from private schools than in districts without significant
competition. We also interviewed many public school principals in Santiago and other cities
about their response to vouchers. We found them fully aware that they were competing for stu-
dents with private schools. But most of the people we interviewed felt that in an environment
where private schooling was considered “higher class,” improving their public schools had little
effect on Chilean parents’ school choice.
As in all research on the competition effect, we had to deal with the so-called “cream skimming”
issue. If parents tend to view private schools as “better” than public schools, higher-educated par-
ents are likely to be the first to transfer their children out of public education. After 20 years of
vouchers, Chilean public schools have a much higher concentration of children with less-edu-
cated parents than in 1980. Since parents’ education is positively related to children’s academic
performance, when higher-educated families switch to private schools, test scores in public
schools tend to decline independent of any positive effect competition may have on test scores in
these same schools. It is virtually impossible to separate out the negative effect on average test
scores of cream skimming from the positive effect on test scores of competition. Public schools
lose their higher-scoring students to private schools, which drives down average public school
test scores, at the same time that school officials try to improve scores to retain students.
The effects of “cream skimming” also were examined in two recent studies of New Zealand’s
school choice plan, where students can choose public or private schools outside their local
area (a type of voucher program). Studies show extensive “cream skimming” takes place in
New Zealand, with increased polarization in the academic performance results between schools
catering to lower-income Maori families and those with mainly higher-income students of
European origin.
Most telling is that average test scores did not go up in Chile and New Zealand despite the com-
petition among schools. Between 1994 and 2001, it is possible to compare Chile’s fourth and
eighth grade test results in the various years each test was given (fourth grade in 1994, 1996, 1998
and 2000; eighth grade in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001). Test scores in this period remained virtu-
ally flat. Neither have researchers found any evidence that New Zealand’s students learned more
once a voucher program was put into place. If competition is supposed to raise educational pro-
ductivity, these systems should be performing better. Instead, researchers have observed a lot of
student shifting among schools with no evident positive effect on overall academic results.
The bottom line is that there is tremendous risk in relying on vouchers to improve low-perform-
ing public schools. Even if the prospect of losing students to private, charter or magnet schools
makes the public schools try harder, they are simultaneously likely to lose their “better” students
to their competitors, especially when voucher programs are larger scale. The danger is that the
public schools become identified even more as “losers” than they were before vouchers were
introduced. This makes it even more difficult to recruit good teachers. As a result, expectations
for student performance may fall even lower and incentives for public schools to improve may
decline instead of increase.
The risk is accentuated by the results of studies that were discussed earlier showing that voucher
students who leave for private schools are likely to do no better academically than they would
have had they stayed in their neighborhood public schools. This is a lose-lose situation, and it is
precisely what seemed to have happened in Chile in the 1980s, before the democratic govern-
ment elected in 1990 implemented a direct intervention policy of improving school facilities, sup-
plying new curriculum materials and retraining teachers to counteract the negative effect of
vouchers and to improve student test results in the lowest-performing schools.
Do vouchers lower educational costs?
Economist Milton Friedman is often described as the founding father of the school voucher move-
ment. In an article written in the 1950s, Friedman contended that government could educate the
nation’s children more cost effectively by giving families fixed amounts of money – vouchers –
for them to use in public or private schools. By eliminating the “monopoly” of public education,
Friedman argued, the cost of education would fall.
Contemporary voucher proponents often cite Friedman in making their claim that private schools
can deliver the same or better schooling for lower cost. This line of reasoning, along with
resource constraints, has kept voucher subsidies in current experiments relatively low. In
Cleveland, for example, families qualifying for school vouchers receive up to a maximum of
$2,250, depending on parents’ income. In Milwaukee, the initial voucher was $2,500, although it
rose in three years to $5,500. The voucher experiments in New York, Washington, D.C., and
Dayton provide subsidies of $1,500-$1,700.
Voucher levels of around $2,500 would probably induce private religious schools to accept some
new students. Although actual costs of education in religious schools vary from locality to locality
and are difficult to estimate because of many hidden subsidies, it seems that urban Catholic pri-
mary school tuition averages about $3,000 and actual costs are probably at least a third more. The
extra cost of adding 10 or 20 more students spread over several grades is relatively low, espe-
cially if no additional teachers have to be hired.
It is also possible that private schools do have lower costs per pupil than public schools even
when they add additional classrooms to accommodate voucher students. Private schools tend to
pay teachers lower salaries than do public schools. They are able to do so because they often hire
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tion of vouchers that could be used in this way to 25 percent, but as reported by New York
Times writer Jacques Steinberg, research by a private group, Policy Matters Ohio, shows that the
proportion of voucher students in Cleveland who already were enrolled in private schools was
actually higher, at 33 percent. The study shows that in some Catholic schools in Cleveland, all the
voucher recipients were already enrolled in private school, and they were predominantly white.
In the expanded Milwaukee program, there was no such limit and the voucher was much larger,
at $5,500. It seems that initially about one-third of the vouchers went to students already in pri-
vate schools.
Should vouchers be targeted at low-income students
or should they be available for all students?
All the current voucher programs in the United States are targeted at low-income, inner-city stu-
dents. A targeted voucher is limited to a certain group of students and is designed to improve
their educational situation. The majority opinion in the recent Supreme Court decision had such
targeted vouchers in mind when it referred to helping children in so-called “failing” schools. 
The advantage of targeting is that it guarantees that private educational providers will serve the
intended student population. This is important because many private schools would rather locate
in districts where they could attract students from better-educated, higher-income families. Such
students bring many more educational resources to schools. This poses a problem even in tar-
geted plans, since private schools may attempt to attract the “better” students from public schools
and keep away those with special educational needs and challenges.
Targeting may create political problems as well. If politicians claim repeatedly that private educa-
tion is better than public schooling, and if they provide vouchers to low-income students to
attend private schools, middle-class parents may begin to demand vouchers for their children as
well. Voucher advocates are also likely to push for expansion of targeted voucher plans to the
general population. For them, restricting vouchers to targeted low-income students is just a first
step to making vouchers available to everyone.
Under a general, non-targeted voucher plan, the primary beneficiaries initially would be students
already in private schools, followed by students living in higher-income areas that could support
more expensive private schools charging higher tuition. Families with children in private schools
willing to accept a voucher will use the voucher to reduce the tuition they already pay. New pri-
vate schools are more likely to locate in higher-income areas where they can attract higher-
income students able to add more tuition to the voucher amount. If the amount of the voucher
were the same for all students, low-income districts would have difficulty attracting new private
schools because most educational entrepreneurs would prefer to go into neighborhoods with
higher scoring, easier-to-teach students from families able to pay additional tuition.
younger teachers and because they offer “better” working conditions, such as brighter students,
smaller class sizes, a more disciplined environment, an absence of special education students or,
most often, a religious environment that conforms to the teacher’s beliefs. There is also a lot of
hiring of young, inexperienced teachers in Catholic and other private schools, who then move on
to public schools to get the higher salaries once they gain experience. As journalist Norman Draper
noted, writing about schools in Minnesota, “Private schools aren’t just privately funded. They get
millions of dollars for textbooks and health and counseling services from the state, as well as bus
service from neighboring public schools and the use of public-school facilities.”
School districts and states should, in theory, be able to take advantage of these lower costs to
save on educational spending. But there are good reasons why this does not happen. One is that
private school operators want the largest possible voucher amount from the state or district. They
want to be able to recruit more experienced teachers, for example, and this costs more. Policy-
makers, on the other hand, want to set vouchers at a fairly low level, but high enough to create
enough seats to accommodate the number of students to be funded by vouchers. Even if some
voucher plans – those in Cleveland, New York, Washington and Dayton, for example – allow pri-
vate schools to charge tuition above the voucher amount, private school operators always have
an incentive to push for higher vouchers, particularly when their competitors, the public schools,
are receiving more money per student than they are.
David Brennan, the Ohio entrepreneur, quickly realized that his Hope Schools were losing money
at Cleveland’s $2,250 voucher level. He tried unsuccessfully to get the legislature to raise the
value of the voucher. Since Ohio also provides for charter schools, funding them at about the
same amount per student as public schools, Brennan converted the Hope Schools into charters to
take advantage of the higher levels of financing. Milwaukee’s original $2,500 voucher also failed
to induce all but a few schools to take voucher students. Milwaukee’s voucher rose from $2,500
to $5,500 in three years under pressure from private school operators claiming they could not
afford to take in students at the lower price.
At $5,500, about the same cost per pupil as in Milwaukee’s primary schools, some private
voucher schools seem to be making a profit. Thus, instead of saving on educational delivery
because of lower teacher salaries, by setting the voucher high enough to attract new private
schools, the public sector transfers some taxpayer dollars from teacher salaries to the pockets of
private school operators. This might be worthwhile if it meant that children in those schools were
learning more, but the evidence from other voucher plans, such as Cleveland’s and Chile’s, sug-
gests that they may well be learning less. Since they are not subject to state testing, there is no
way of knowing whether this is true.
Another problem with trying to use vouchers to lower public spending is that much of the
voucher money might be used to subsidize students already in private schools, even when the
voucher is limited to low-income students. In Cleveland, the Ohio legislature limited the propor-
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voucher plan in the past 10 years. But the academic gains are simply not there, or at least none
but the most enthusiastic voucher advocates have been able to find them. Voucher parents tend
to like their children’s private schools, but all the data suggest that vouchers have not produced
significant academic gains either for the children who switched to private schools or the children
who stayed behind in the public schools competing with the private schools.
Considered carefully, these results make sense. The assumption underlying the whole notion of
vouchers is that for a given amount of resources, private schools are more productive than public
schools. For that to be true, private schools must be able to recruit more productive teachers and
administrators than public schools can. Alternatively, similarly capable teachers and administrators
working in a private school setting would have to be more effective than if they were working in
a public school with similar students. If we assume that teachers and administrators in private
schools are, on average, more productive, any group of students switching out of a public school
into a private school is likely to improve its average academic performance. But no one has been
able to find better-than-average teaching or even school organization in private schools with stu-
dents of similar socioeconomic backgrounds to students in public schools.
Luis Benveniste, Richard Rothstein and I have studied many private and public schools in
California looking for differences in academic quality, but we could not find such differences. We
found that private Catholic primary schools in a typical urban school district employ teachers and
administrators who are no better or worse than the district’s public school teachers and adminis-
trators. Private schools may be able to select students whose parents are more concerned with
their children’s safety or religious (moral) training, but we found the academic quality of the
teaching and administration was about the same as in the public sector. However, we did find
major differences in the academic expectations and focus on learning between those schools,
both private and public, attended by students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and those
private and public schools attended by lower-income children. Parents and school personnel in
higher-income neighborhoods, whether private or public, were much more focused on academic
issues than were parents and school personnel in lower-income neighborhoods.
Finally, implementing voucher plans, even in small experiments, is not a simple matter. State and
local governments must consider the economic and political implications of their choices, includ-
ing the amount of the voucher, the decision about whether to hold private voucher schools
more accountable and decisions about which families should be eligible for vouchers. The
Court’s majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris focused on constitutional issues related to
the form of the tuition aid and the choices that were available to parents, not on the desirability
of vouchers themselves. The opinion sidestepped data on the academic outcomes of private
school vouchers, as well as issues of accountability and student eligibility. States and school dis-
tricts will not be able to do so. With small potential educational benefits and major political
risks, voucher plans have not appealed to the vast majority of states and school districts in the
past. Indeed, voters in at least six states have defeated ballot initiatives to establish voucher pro-
Should private schools receiving vouchers be 
regulated in the same manner as public schools?
In public education systems, schools are highly regulated by government and accountable to tax-
payers to educate children according to standards set by school districts and the state. Schools are
financially reviewed by state auditors, teachers are certified by the state, schools have to deliver a
required curriculum and publicly elected school board members are accountable to their con-
stituents. They are also obligated to educate all school children, including those with special
needs and educational challenges.
Recently these accountability systems have been expanded to include regular testing of students
by the state and sanctions on “failing” schools that do not improve to meet higher standards.
None of this guarantees that a particular school will be a good school, but it does give taxpayers
a lot of information to judge whether schools are doing what they are mandated to do. Should
private schools that accept public subsidies be subject to the same degree of accountability that
taxpayers demand from public schools? Most voucher proponents argue that they should not, in
part because strong accountability to the state, beyond financial audits, would dampen educa-
tional innovation. But without comparable information, at least on private schools’ average aca-
demic performance, parents might think that their children are receiving an excellent education
only to learn too late that they were wrong.
The regulation issue is particularly serious because many, if not most, private schools – particu-
larly religious schools – may not accept vouchers if they are required to submit to the same regu-
lations and standards as public schools. This could significantly reduce the supply of private
schools entering the market, which might deter states that want to implement major voucher
plans from imposing any accountability demands on private schools. Unregulated voucher plans
also are less expensive for states to administer than regulated ones. If states or districts attempt to
implement the voucher plans envisaged by the Supreme Court majority in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, they could end up with dual educational systems, in which private schools are unregu-
lated and public schools are subject to strict standards and public accountability.
Are vouchers worth it even if they are constitutional?
Voucher proponents often claim that vouchers will greatly improve American education by
introducing more competition into the nation’s school systems. They also insist that vouchers
will greatly improve and expand the educational opportunities available to low-income, inner
city children.
If this were the case, we should be able to see these changes in Cleveland, Milwaukee, New
York, Washington, D.C., Dayton, Chile and New Zealand, all of which have tried some form of
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grams – most notably in California and Michigan, where voters in November 2000 defeated pro-
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